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Previous studies have shown that creativity is enhanced by a broad attentional scope,
defined as an ability to utilize peripheral stimuli and process information globally. We
propose that the reverse relationship also holds, and that breadth of attention also
is a consequence of engaging in a creative activity. In Study 1, participants showed
increased breadth of attention in a visual scanning task after performing a divergent
thinking task as opposed to an analytic thinking task. In Study 2, participants recognized
peripheral stimuli displayed during the task better after performing a divergent thinking
task as compared to an analytic task, whereas recognition performance of participants
performing a task that involves a mix of divergent and analytic thinking (the Remote
Associates Test) fell in between. Additionally, in Study 2 (but not in Study 1), breadth of
attention was positively correlated with performance in a divergent thinking task, but not
with performance in an analytic thinking task. Our findings suggest that the adjustment
of the cognitive system to task demands manifests at a very basic, perceptual
level, through changes in the breadth of visual attention. This paper contributes a
new, motivational perspective on attentional breadth and discusses it as a result of
adjusting cognitive processing to the task requirements, which contributes to effective
self-regulation.
Keywords: creativity, idea generation, divergent thinking, breadth of attention, self-regulation, analytic thinking,
Remote Associates Test, convergent thinking
INTRODUCTION
What is the temperature in the place you are currently in and what background sounds can
you hear? Unless the environmental conditions are extreme, you probably did not register these
peripheral, seemingly unimportant stimuli. Indeed, doing so would only be distracting and may
interfere with other activities. When generating creative ideas (ideas that are both novel and useful;
Amabile, 1983), however, having a broad attentional scope and noticing peripheral stimuli can
be beneficial. For example, Mendelsohn and Griswold (1964) found that people who score high
on creativity tests, as compared to less creative problem solvers, are better able to take advantage
of peripheral cues (prompts) to solve the task at hand, and similar results were obtained in later
experiments (Mendelsohn and Griswold, 1966; Mendelsohn and Lindholm, 1972; Ansburg and
Hill, 2003). More recent studies also found strong support for the beneficial effect of broad attention
on creative idea generation: Creativity is enhanced by meditation techniques that broaden attention
(Colzato et al., 2012, 2017; see also Lebuda et al., 2016), as well as by experimental manipulations
that increase attentional breadth (Friedman et al., 2003; Förster et al., 2004; Jia et al., 2009; Liu,
2016; Moraru et al., 2016). It has even been found that alcohol intake can facilitate creative problem
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1772
fpsyg-09-01772 September 19, 2018 Time: 18:38 # 2
Wronska et al. Engaging in Creativity Broadens Attentional Scope
solving, which is expected to be driven by reduced attentional
control and higher sensitivity to peripheral information (Jarosz
et al., 2012).
Although it is clear that breadth of attention influences
creative performance, here we explore the intriguing possibility
of the reverse causal relation: that engaging in creative activity
can influence attentional breadth. Just as certain types of
meditation or experimental manipulations enhance breadth of
attention, engaging in a creative task may broaden the attentional
field. This possibility is intriguing because it would suggest
that the cognitive system is able to adapt to task demands
at a fundamental (perceptual) level. Indeed, Vartanian (2009)
suggests that successful problem solving requires the cognitive
system to flexibly adjust to task requirements. Because creative
tasks are ill-defined and demand exploration of problem space
(e.g., Arreola and Reiter-Palmon, 2016), a broader attentional
scope is beneficial and may be triggered by the particular activities
for which it is needed. For example, it is possible that engaging
in brainstorming activates a completely different mindset (which
manifests in the attentional breadth) than engaging in planning
an agenda, because planning does not require a broad search for
solutions whereas brainstorming does.
The current paper reports two experiments in which we
manipulated engagement in certain activities (creative idea
generation or other) and measured attentional breadth in
different ways. Specifically, we measured attentional breadth
as a consequence of engagement in a divergent thinking task,
an analytic thinking task, or (only in Study 2) in the Remote
Associates Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962), a test that involves a mix
of divergent and analytic thinking. Together, these studies suggest
that the cognitive system adaptively responds to task demands at
a very basic level of information processing (breadth of attention)
and that breadth of attention is also a consequence of engaging
in a creative activity. Based on these and prior findings, we
propose that the attentional breadth–creativity relation is, in fact,
bi-directional.
Broad Attention Stimulates Creativity
According to Mednick’s (1962) associative theory, creativity
requires finding elements that are remotely associated and
combining them in a meaningful way. This theory explains why
a broad scope of attention should increase creativity: It gives
access to a larger pool of elements, and therefore, facilitates
original combinations of these elements (Mendelsohn, 1976).
Mednick proposed that people differ in the strength of their
associations to certain concepts (e.g., “table”), with some people
having a steep association hierarchy and others a flatter one. If
one association dominates (e.g., “chair”), then the remaining,
potentially creative associations are less likely to be activated,
and the association hierarchy is steep; however, if various
associations are similarly strong, the association hierarchy is
relatively flat, which may lead to more creative outcomes. Because
a broad scope of attention implies that diverse elements in
the perceptual field are similarly important, broad attention
should facilitate a flat association hierarchy. This idea has been
proposed by Martindale (1989), who suggested that the mind
can be represented as a set of interconnected nodes, similar to
neural networks, which may be activated in different degrees
(see also Spreading-Activation Theory of Semantic Processing;
Collins and Loftus, 1975). When attention is narrow, strong
activation of a single node prevents activation from spreading
to other nodes in the network – in this case, a single concept
(like “chair” in response to “table”) is activated strongly and
adjacent nodes (like “tablecloth”) are inhibited. However, when
more nodes are activated simultaneously and attention is broad,
then the activation of each node is weaker, and there is no
inhibiting effect on other nodes. Such situations lead to the
generation of more remote, and potentially creative, associations.
A similar idea has been proposed by the extensive–intensive
attention theory (Kolan´czyk, 1989, 1991, 2011, 2012): extensive
attention relates to more sensitivity toward peripheral stimuli
(rather than strong focus on central stimuli) and consequently,
weak activation of a large pool of nodes in the semantic
network.
Consistent with this idea, Mendelsohn (1976) found that those
who are able to connect remote ideas are also those who can take
advantage of seemingly irrelevant, peripheral stimuli to solve the
task at hand. Furthermore, Ansburg and Hill (2003) confirmed
this idea by showing that scores on the RAT (Mednick, 1962),
a test which measures the ability to make remote associations,
positively predict the number of word puzzles (anagrams) solved
with peripheral cues (answers to the word puzzles played on
the tape recorder in the background). Other evidence is also
consistent with this reasoning. For example, Kasof (1997) found
a positive relation between creativity of poems and sensitivity
to peripheral stimuli in the environment. Experimental studies
confirm that it is indeed a broad conceptual scope that increases
creative performance (Isen and Daubman, 1984; Isen et al.,
1987; Jarosz et al., 2012; Deuja et al., 2014; Chiu, 2015; Liu,
2016). Finally, studies on meditation suggest that attending to
the surroundings in a broad and defocused manner boosts
creativity: Open monitoring, compared with focused attention
meditation, has been found to increase performance in creative
idea generation (Colzato et al., 2012, 2017; Baas et al., 2014).
Together, these findings provide converging evidence that broad
attention facilitates creative performance by expanding the scope
of concepts that may be combined into a potentially creative
outcome.
Does Engaging in Creativity Lead to
Broader Attention?
Although it is well established that broad attention increases
creativity, the idea that engaging in creative activity could alter
the breadth of the attentional field has not yet been investigated.
If generating creative ideas requires broadening the conceptual
scope to transcend from obvious solutions to more original ones,
it is also possible that attempting to produce creative output in
itself will broaden the attentional field. This can be true especially
when we compare it with engaging in an activity that does
not require such expansion of horizons, or even asks for the
opposite – focusing only on the task-relevant information to
arrive at a single correct solution (cf. Ansburg and Hill, 2003; Liu,
2016).
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Indirect support for this idea comes from the studies that
contrasted divergent thinking tasks with the RAT (Akbari
Chermahini and Hommel, 2012; Fischer and Hommel, 2012).
In divergent thinking tasks, participants were asked to generate
multiple creative uses of an everyday object (e.g., a brick), whereas
in the RAT participants had to provide a single word that is a
common associate for three words that were provided; here, only
one solution was correct. Hommel (2012) argued that engaging
in these tasks induces a certain control state, which either
favors flexible switching between options with little “top-down”
guidance (divergent thinking) or releases a strong top-down
bias, which guides a person toward one specific option (solving
the RAT). The first case is associated with achieving creativity
through flexible and relatively effortless processing (i.e., low
cognitive control and low self-control; Kolan´czyk, 2012), whereas
the second refers to creativity achieved through persistent and
effortful processing (i.e., high cognitive control; Nijstad et al.,
2010). Results have shown that engaging in divergent thinking,
compared with solving the RAT, led to higher multitasking
performance (Fischer and Hommel, 2012), and to a more
positive mood (Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, 2012), which is
associated with broad attention and global processing (Isen and
Daubman, 1984; Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005; Bramesfeld
and Gasper, 2008; Kuhbandner et al., 2011; Schmid et al., 2011).
Overview of the Present Studies
Overall, these results suggest that the weak top-down control
state induced by divergent thinking should be connected with
defocused and broader attention (see also Martindale, 1989;
Kolan´czyk, 2012; Zhou et al., 2017). However, to the best of
our knowledge, there is no direct evidence showing this effect.
Providing a direct test of this idea is the aim of the present
contribution. If indeed engaging in a divergent thinking task
broadens the attentional field (as compared with engaging in
analytic thinking task) this would indicate that, at a very basic
perceptual level, the cognitive system can adapt to task demands.
To test the idea that engaging in creative activity leads to a
broader attentional field, we performed two studies, in which we
compared a divergent thinking task with an analytic thinking
task (Study 1) and a divergent thinking task with both an
analytic thinking task and the RAT (Study 2). We expected
that performing a divergent thinking task would lead to a
broader attentional field than performing an analytic thinking
task, because top-down cognitive control is lower for a task
that requires flexible and explorative processing (i.e., divergent
thinking) than for a task that requires careful evaluation of task-
related information to arrive at a single correct solution (i.e.,
analytic thinking). In turn, these differences in mindset and
cognitive control state will translate to differences in breadth of
attention.
Both studies used a between-subjects design and employed
different measures of breadth of attention. Study 1 measured
attentional breadth with a task specifically designed to measure
extensive–intensive attention states (Roczniewska et al., 2011),
with a state of extensive attention defined as broader and
more sensitive to peripheral stimuli than a state of intensive
attention. In the second study, we drew from the peripheral cues
paradigm (Mendelsohn and Griswold, 1964) to measure breadth
of attention through recognition of peripheral stimuli. We
also assessed performance on each task and examined whether
performance in each of the tasks correlates with our measure
of breadth of attention. As discussed above, previous research
suggests that breadth of attention should correlate positively with




Ninety undergraduate students participated in an experiment on
the “properties of cognitive processes” in exchange for credit
points. However, 14 participants were excluded from analysis
due to: disrupted procedure during attention measurement (e.g.,
talking to the experimenter, the door being opened, noise),
using a touchpad instead of a mouse, failing to understand the
attentional breadth measure instruction (e.g., selecting very few
stimuli, see the description of the Ellipses Test in Measures), and
a computer malfunction. Data from 76 participants was analyzed
(59 females and 17 males), whose age ranged from 18 to 53 years
(M = 21.59, SD = 4.16). Average age did not differ between
conditions, t(74) = 0.26, p = 0.798.
Participants were randomly assigned to two conditions of a
between-subjects design. In the divergent thinking task condition
(n = 40; 30 female, Mage = 21.48), participants performed the
Unusual Uses Task with instructions developed by Silvia et al.
(2008). Participants were asked to write down all original and
creative uses of a brick they could think of. Participants in the
analytic thinking task condition (n = 36; 29 female, Mage = 21.72)
were asked to solve a task from the analytic reasoning section of
the Law School Admission Test (Princeton Review, 2015; also
see Kray et al., 2006). This test measures the ability to derive
conclusions from a set of assumptions and asks participants
to apply logic to multifaceted problems, understand how rules
affect outcomes and decisions, and identify connections between
concepts. The task that we employed required the participants to
follow five rules (e.g., “the student must clean the kitchen first
before shopping for groceries”) to determine the correct order




To measure breadth of attention, we used the Ellipses Test
(Roczniewska et al., 2011), which consisted of 363 letters (a, d, e,
k, s, and w) arranged in the shape of ellipses on a computer screen.
Ellipses made of letters varied in size, with smaller ellipses located
inside bigger ellipses (see Figure 1). Letters were displayed in
a black font on a white background. Participants had to select
letters d with mouse clicks. After a letter had been clicked, its
color turned to green to mark its selection. Some ds were spread
out (n = 17) and others (n = 43) appeared in small clusters, which
made them easier to spot with a broader attentional field. We used
the distance between selections (percentages of the screen size)
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FIGURE 1 | The Ellipses Test (Roczniewska et al., 2011). In this example, one letter has been selected – the d marked in green font.
as indicator of attentional breadth and computed two indicators:
total distance covered (“travelled”) by the solver while searching
for ds and the standard deviation (SD) of distance between clicks.
Total distance was computed as the sum of distances between
all clicks. High total distance indicates that the solver searched
for ds globally, within a broad perceptual field; low total distance
indicates that the solver searched for ds locally, within a narrow
perceptual field. SD of distance was computed to examine the
amount of variation in distances. Because most ds appeared in
clusters and broad (but not narrow) attention should facilitate
spotting such clusters, this should result in small distances within
each cluster and big distances between the clusters, thus creating
a high standard deviation. Participants may differ in how many
letters they selected in total, so we controlled for the total number
of clicked letters, as this could bias the attentional breadth
indicators.
Control measures
It is possible that engaging in different tasks influenced
participants’ mood state. Because moods affect creative
performance (Baas et al., 2008), we employed two versions
of a 4-item questionnaire to measure pretest and posttest mood
(Wojciszke and Baryła, 2004). Participants rated statements (e.g.,
“I’m in a bad mood”) on a 5-point scale (1 = disagree, 5 = agree).
Scale reliabilities were good (Cronbach’s α = 0.91 for version
A and Cronbach’s α = 0.89 for version B). We also controlled
the subjective difficulty of the task (Bujacz et al., 2014), because
task difficulty may affect attentional processes (e.g., Santangelo
et al., 2011; see also Santangelo and Spence, 2008). Participants
indicated to what extent they found the previous task: “easy,”
“undemanding,” “unproblematic” (all reverse scored), “difficult,”
“complicated,” and “challenging” (Cronbach’s α = 0.85). We
employed a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very
much). Moreover, participants were asked to rate their task
enjoyment (Friedman and Förster, 2002; “How much did you
enjoy the task?”), using the same 7-point scale.
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants gave written informed consent and
were randomly assigned to a divergent thinking or analytic
thinking task condition. The experiment was run in Inquisit
Lab4. First, participants answered four pretest mood items
(Wojciszke and Baryła, 2004). Subsequently, they engaged in a
divergent thinking (Silvia et al., 2008) or analytic thinking task
(Princeton Review, 2015; also see Kray et al., 2006) for 1.5 min.
Participants could take notes on a sheet of paper, and after
1.5 min, an audio sound signaled that they had to look at the
screen again. They were asked to stop the task and were informed
that they would be able to finish it later. Next, the Ellipses Test was
administered to measure attentional breadth (Roczniewska et al.,
2011). Participants were instructed that a number of letters would
appear on the screen. Their task was to select as many letters d as
possible with mouse clicks.
After 2 min, the test ended and the participants were
instructed to finish the divergent thinking or analytic thinking
task. In the divergent thinking task condition, participants
continued writing down possible uses of a brick for another
1.5 min. In total (before and after the Ellipses Test), they thus
performed the divergent thinking task for 3 min (see also Silvia
et al., 2008). When the time was up, they had to choose their
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two most creative ideas and underline them. Participants in the
analytic thinking task condition had 5 min to finish their task.
The longer time was chosen to ensure that it was sufficient
and proportional to task difficulty. However, participants were
allowed to finish earlier, on condition that they had completed
the task (finishing early was not allowed in the divergent thinking
task condition). Participants were not informed about the time
limit to avoid the confounding effect of time pressure (e.g., Hsu
and Fan, 2010).
In the final part, participants rated their posttest mood with
items differing from those used at the beginning (Wojciszke
and Baryła, 2004). Subsequently, they evaluated the subjective
difficulty and their enjoyment of the task; they indicated their
gender, age, and were thanked for participation.
Coding Performance
Divergent thinking task
For the divergent thinking task, we closely followed the subjective
scoring procedures developed by Silvia et al. (2008). Responses
to the divergent thinking task were typed into a spreadsheet
and sorted alphabetically. We engaged three coders (including
the first author), all of whom were the alumni or students of
an advanced university course on the psychology of creativity
(including creativity diagnosis). They were trained by the
first author and asked to read each response. Each coder
independently scored the responses on a scale from 1 (not at
all creative) to 5 (highly creative). Scoring instructions were
translated from Silvia et al. (2008) by the first author and then
back-translated by a professional English teacher (Polish native
speaker). We obtained two indicators of creative performance:
average creativity of all responses of each participant (average
creativity) and an average from the two responses that the
participant marked as the most creative (top 2 creativity).
The interrater reliability was satifactory: intraclass correlation
coefficient (ICC; two-way random model, absolute agreement)
was 0.811 (p < 0.001) for the average creativity and 0.680
(p < 0.001) for top 2 creativity, which indicates good and
moderate reliability, respectively (Koo and Li, 2016).
Analytic thinking task
The aim of the analytic thinking task was to order household
chores according to rules given (Princeton Review, 2015; also see
Kray et al., 2006). Two possible orders could be correctly derived
from the rules. In the 0–1 indicator, participants scored one point
when the entire sequence of chores was correct; otherwise, the
score was 0 points. In the 0–5 indicator, one point was given for
each condition that was met (e.g., if all conditions were met, the
participant scored five points).
Results
Control Variables
Control variables (task enjoyment and subjective difficulty,
pretest and posttest mood1) did not differ between experimental
1Additionally, we tested whether the divergent thinking task triggered a more
positive mood and the analytic task triggered a more negative mood, as reported
by Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2012). We performed a two-way repeated
measures ANOVA with task type as a between-subjects factor (independent
conditions (all ts< 1.14; ps> 0.257). Mean accuracy (the number
of clicked ds divided by the number of all clicked letters) in the
Ellipses Test did not differ between conditions either, t(74) = 0.26,
p = 0.794. Similarly, there were no differences between conditions
in the number of all clicked letters (t[74] = 0.28, p = 0.783),
number of clicked ds (t[74] = 0.35, p = 0.732; Mdivergent = 59.58,
Manalytic = 59.28), and in the number of other clicked letters
(t[74] = 0.20, p = 0.845, Mdivergent = 0.88, Manalytic = 0.92). This
is in line with the assumptions of the method, which diagnoses
attentional breadth not through the effectiveness of finding the
ds but through the strategy of searching the perceptual field.
Effect of the Task on Breadth of Attention
We performed a multivariate analysis of covariance
(MANCOVA) with task type (divergent vs. analytic) as
independent variable, total distance and SD of distance as
dependent variables, and total number of clicked letters as a
covariate. We found a significant multivariate effect: participants
who solved the divergent thinking task had broader attention
(Mtotal = 962.43, MSD = 17.56) than participants who solved
the analytic thinking task (Mtotal = 909.81, MSD = 16.07),
F(2, 72) = 3.19, p = 0.047 (see Figure 2). Total number of
clicked letters was a significant covariate, F(2, 72) = 35.57,
p < 0.001. In a follow-up univariate analyses, the effect of task
type (divergent vs. analytic) on total distance did not reach
significance level when corrected for multiple comparisons, F(1,
73) = 3.99, p = 0.050 (p = 0.100 with Bonferroni correction), but
the univariate effect of task type (divergent vs. analytic) on SD of
distance was significant, F(1, 73) = 6.24, p = 0.015 (p = 0.030 with
Bonferroni correction). Confidence intervals for both effects did
not include zero, 95% CI (0.09, 102.93) for total distance and 95%
CI (0.31, 2.76) for SD of distance, which suggests a significant
difference for both indicators. Total number of clicked letters was
a significant covariate for SD of distance, F(1,73) = 7.13, p = 0.009
(p = 0.018 with Bonferroni correction), but not for total distance,
F(1,73) = 1.78, p = 0.186 (p = 0.372 with Bonferroni correction).
The effect size was small to moderate (Cohen’s d = 0.47 for total
distance; Cohen’s d = 0.54 for SD of distance; Cohen, 1977).
In order to verify whether mood, subjective task difficulty
and enjoyment can account for the influence of the task type
(divergent vs. analytic) on breadth of attention, we performed
another MANCOVA. In this analysis, we additionally entered the
following covariates: pretest mood, subjective task difficulty, and
task enjoyment. We found that the additional covariates had no
multivariate effect on breadth of attention (all ps> 0.13) and that
the multivariate effect of the task type (divergent vs. analytic)
on breadth of attention remained significant, F(2, 29) = 3.84,
p = 0.026. Both effects in a univariate follow-up analyses remained
at the same significance level as in the analysis without additional
covariates, F(1, 70) = 4.02, p = 0.049 (p = 0.098 with Bonferroni
variable) and mood as a within-subjects factor (dependent variable). We found
a significant interaction between task type and mood F(1,74) = 11.77, p = 0.001.
A follow-up simple effects analysis revealed that solving a divergent thinking task
induced a more positive mood (Mpretest = 3.79. Mposttest = 3.97, p = 0.044, Cohen’s
d = 0.39), whereas solving an analytic thinking task elicited a more negative one
(Mpretest = 4.04, Mposttest = 3.79, p = 0.007, Cohen’s d = 0.66). This is in line with
findings of Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2012).
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FIGURE 2 | Standardized breadth of attention (total distance and SD of distance) in divergent thinking task condition and analytic thinking task condition in Study 1.
Total distance (in z-scores) ranged from –2.41 to 2.26, and SD of distance ranged from –2.25 to 2.34.
correction) for total distance and F(1, 70) = 7.13, p = 0.009
(p = 0.018 with Bonferroni correction) for SD of distance. Thus,
pretest mood, subjective task difficulty, and enjoyment cannot
explain the influence of task type (divergent vs. analytic) on
attentional breadth.
Performance
We performed a correlation analysis separately for the divergent
and analytical thinking task condition to examine whether
breadth of attention correlated with performance. We found that
performance in the divergent thinking task, as well as in the
analytic thinking task, was unrelated to total distance and SD of
distance (−0.16 < r < 0.05; all ps > 0.351).
TABLE 1 | Education and main activity of participants in Study 2.
Divergent
thinking task
(n = 47) (%)
Analytic
thinking task
(n = 45) (%)
RAT
(n = 46) (%)
Total
sample
(N = 138) (%)
Education
Primary school 0 0 2.2 0.7
High school 53.2 37.8 37.0 42.8
University level 42.5 62.2 60.8 55.1
Missing 4.3 – – 1.4
Main activity
Education 61.7 26.7 65.2 65.9
Paid work 27.7 71.1 23.9 26.1
Other 6.4 2.2 10.9 6.5
Missing 4.3 – – 1.4
Discussion of Study 1
Study 1 provided initial evidence that engaging in a divergent
thinking task, compared with engaging in an analytic thinking
task, broadens the scope of attention. We found a significant
multivariate effect on attention indicators (total distance and SD
of distance), both when we did and did not control for pretest
mood, subjective task difficulty, and enjoyment. This suggests
that these control variables cannot explain the effect of task
type (divergent vs. analytic) on attentional breadth. We found a
significant univariate effect on SD of distance, but the univariate
effect on total distance did not reach significance. This suggests
that broad attention triggered by the divergent thinking task was
not so strongly visible in global search for the target letters within
a broad perceptual field; instead, it was more reliably reflected in
higher variation of distances obtained when the solver noticed
and clicked on the ds that appeared in clusters. Furthermore,
and somewhat surprisingly, in this study, attentional breadth
was unrelated to creative performance. A possible explanation
is that breadth of attention was measured in the middle of
task performance. Switching attention between idea generation
and the Ellipses Test potentially disrupted the flow of ideas
while participants were generating creative solutions, which may
have weakened the correlation between attentional breadth and
creative performance.
STUDY 2
To replicate the findings of Study 1 and generalize the results
to other divergent and analytic thinking tasks, we performed
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Study 2. In this study, we wanted to avoid interrupting
participants by the Ellipses Test, and therefore measured
attentional breadth via the recognition of peripheral stimuli
which were displayed during task performance. This method
builds on the paradigm of incidental (peripheral) stimuli in
creative problem solving (Mendelsohn and Griswold, 1964, 1966;
Mendelsohn and Lindholm, 1972; Mendelsohn, 1976). In the
studies of Mendelsohn and colleagues, participants were exposed
to words played on a tape recorder while memorizing a list of
other words. Next, they were asked to solve multiple anagrams.
Some of the answers to the anagrams were earlier played on
the tape recorder (answers to “peripheral anagrams”) and some
were present on the list (answers to “central anagrams”). Those
participants who achieved high scores on the creativity test also
solved more peripheral anagrams (cf. Ansburg and Hill, 2003).
Our study, however, used recognition of visual peripheral stimuli
as a dependent variable, with the assumption that incidental
recognition of peripheral cues would be better when attention is
broad (vs. narrow) during task performance.
We also added a condition in which participants performed
the RAT (Mednick, 1962). Interestingly, the RAT requires both
divergent thinking (coming up with multiple candidates for
the solution) and analytic thinking (evaluating the correctness
of possible answers; Mendelsohn, 1976). Although previous
research argued that solving the RAT requires more cognitive
control than solving a divergent thinking task (Fischer and
Hommel, 2012; Hommel, 2012), it has been found that the RAT
can be solved both through an insight strategy (spontaneous
activation of diverse associations) and through an analytic
strategy (effortful and sequential search for close associations;
see e.g., Bowden et al., 2005; Harkins, 2006). Furthermore,
Topolinski and Strack (2008) found that just reading a RAT trial
(three remotely associated words) triggers spreading activation
in the semantic network: Participants who only read the RAT
trials recognized solutions to those trials faster than unrelated,
random words. However, the authors also found that intentional
search for the solution blocks spreading activation in the semantic
network: participants who intentionally searched for solutions
recognized the solutions to those trials as quickly as unrelated,
random words. This suggests that on the one hand, just reading
RAT trials primes broad activation of the semantic network.
Since such conceptual breadth translates into perceptual breadth
of attention (Förster and Dannenberg, 2010), reading the RAT
trial should broaden the perceptual field of attention. On the
other hand, converging on a single solution should block
spreading activation in the semantic network, and thus narrow
the attentional field. In other words, performing the RAT may
have mixed effects on breadth of attention, and therefore, we
decided to explore its effects.
Method
Participants and Design
One hundred thirty-eight participants were recruited through the
university participant recruitment system and social networks to
participate in an experiment on “solving different tasks” (107
females and 31 males). Their age ranged from 19 to 53 years
(M = 26.79, SD = 8.31). Average age did not differ between
conditions, F(2, 133) = 0.812, p = 0.446. To diversify our sample,
in this study, apart from student participants (n = 97), we also
recruited people who were not enrolled at university and who
pursued a creative career or had a creative hobby (n = 38;
background of three participants was not saved due to an internet
connection error). Education and main activity of participants
are summarized in Table 1. Student participants earned credit
points for participation. Student and non-student participants
could obtain one of seven shopping vouchers worth 50 PLN
(around 12 €). Participants were seated at computers separated
by screening walls in the laboratory, and were run individually or
in small groups (maximally four participants).
Participants were randomly assigned to three conditions of a
between-subjects design: divergent thinking (n = 47, 38 female,
Mage = 25.78), analytic thinking (n = 45, 33 female, Mage = 26.67),
and the RAT (n = 46, 36 female, Mage = 28.00). As a divergent
thinking task, we employed the Unusual Uses Task (Silvia et al.,
2008). Participants in the analytic thinking task condition were
asked to solve a task inspired by a task from the mathematical
competition for pupils (Towarzystwo Upowszechniania Wiedzy
i Nauk Matematycznych, 2016) and by a task used by Ansburg
and Hill (2003). It required the participants to determine the
order of men, from the tallest to the smallest. Participants were
informed that the men have different height and different eye
colors. Three premises were given, which enabled participants
to derive a correct solution (e.g., “Adam is not the tallest, and
Lucas does not have green eyes”). As a third condition, we used




Participants’ task in each of the conditions was displayed in
the middle of the screen on a white background, which was
surrounded by a gray frame. Twenty-five peripheral stimuli,
geometric shapes and symbols, were displayed on the gray
frame, always in the same locations and for the duration of
the whole task (see Figure 3; the same number of peripheral
stimuli – 25 – was used in previous research, e.g., Mendelsohn
and Griswold, 1964). Participants were given no information
or explanation about why the symbols were there. Breadth of
attention was measured by recognition of peripheral stimuli
that were displayed on the screen during task performance. The
recognition test started after the main task and a mood check
had been completed, but participants were not informed earlier
that they would perform the recognition test. It included 25
peripheral and 20 filler symbols (i.e., symbols that were not
present on the screen during the task solution). Participants
indicated whether a symbol was present on the screen during the
task solution by pressing a number on the keyboard (1 = definitely
no, 2 = rather no, 3 = rather yes, and 4 = definitely yes). We
recoded these scores into 0 (no; score 1 or 2) and 1 (yes; score 3
or 4). A recognition index was computed by taking the difference
between the percentage of hits (i.e., the proportion of peripheral
symbols that were correctly classified as present) and percentage
of false alarms (i.e., the proportion of filler symbols that were
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FIGURE 3 | The task with instructions in the heading, response window in the middle of the screen, and symbols in the peripheries of the screen (divergent thinking
task condition) in Study 2.
falsely classified as present). Higher recognition index scores
indicate more accurate recognition, which means that attention
was broader during the task solution. Possible values for this
indicator vary from −100 (e.g., 0% of hits and 100% of false
alarms) to 100 (e.g., 100% of hits and 0% of false alarms).
Control measures
We employed an Affect Grid to measure mood after the
task (Russell et al., 1989). Participants were presented with
a square grid divided into 9 × 9 square fields. The vertical
dimension represented arousal, from sleepiness in the lower part
to high arousal in the upper part, and the horizontal dimension
represented valence, from unpleasant feelings on the left to
pleasant feelings on the right. Participants were instructed to click
on the field that reflected their feelings most accurately. In this
way, we obtained two mood indicators from each participant:
valence (ranging from 1 = unpleasant to 9 = pleasant) and
arousal (ranging from 1 = sleepiness to 9 = high arousal). We
also controlled for the subjective difficulty with an adjective scale
(Cronbach’s α = 0.87 for all six items) and enjoyment of the
task, using the same measures as in Study 1. Controlling for
subjective difficulty is particularly important, because this may
affect attention to peripheral stimuli (Santangelo et al., 2011).
Procedure
The study consisted of two parts: online and laboratory. In the
online part, participants gave an informed consent and filled
in questionnaires, results of which are not reported in this
paper.2 Upon arrival in the lab, participants were randomly
assigned to the divergent thinking, analytic thinking, or the RAT
condition. The experiment was run in the Inquisit Lab5. In
the first part, not reported in this paper, participants took part
in another experiment, in which they also solved a divergent
thinking task, analytic thinking task or the RAT. After the first
part, the divergent thinking, analytic thinking task or the RAT
was displayed in the middle of the screen and 25 stimuli were
displayed in the peripheries. Participants remained in the same
condition that they were assigned to in the first part (i.e., they
solved a different task of the same type for the second time).
In the divergent thinking task condition, people generated
creative uses of a potato (Silvia et al., 2008) and entered their ideas
in the field located in the middle of the screen. The time limit was
not mentioned, and the task automatically terminated after 180 s.
In the analytic thinking task condition, participants ordered four
men from the smallest to the tallest, based on the premises
given (Ansburg and Hill, 2003; Towarzystwo Upowszechniania
Wiedzy i Nauk Matematycznych, 2016). Their task was to write
the names of men in the correct order in the field located in the
middle of the screen. The time limit set for this task – 360 s –
was not mentioned. The longer time was chosen to ensure that
it was sufficient and proportional to the difficulty. However,
2Details on these measures may be obtained from the first author.
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participants were allowed to finish earlier, on condition that they
completed the task (which was not allowed in the divergent
thinking task condition). In the RAT condition, participants
solved eight RAT trials (Sobków et al., 2016). One trial consisted
of three words and a response field displayed on a single screen.
The time limit was not mentioned, and each trial automatically
terminated after 30 s (Sobków et al., 2016). However, participants
were allowed to finish earlier, on condition that they completed
the trial. We intended to provide participants in each of the
conditions with a similar amount of time to solve the task. Solving
all eight RAT trials could take a maximum of 240 s, which was
similar to the solution time in other conditions.
Next, all participants performed a mood check (Affect Grid;
Russell et al., 1989), and proceeded with the recognition test
(“Was this stimulus present on the screen?”). One stimulus at a
time was displayed on the screen, and participants responded to
all 25 peripheral and 20 filler stimuli in random order. In the end,




We trained three independent coders to score three classic
indicators of creativity: fluency, flexibility, and originality
(Guilford, 1950, 1967). Participants’ responses were typed into a
spreadsheet and sorted alphabetically. To obtain fluency measure,
the coders counted all generated ideas. To score flexibility, the
coders classified each idea into one of 15 categories predefined
by the first author and verified with other coders before scoring
(e.g., “using potato as a container: making some kind of a
container from a potato, where other objects can be stored”).
Flexibility of a participant was the number of non-redundant
categories in which we could classify the responses. Originality
of an idea was rated on a scale from 1 (not original at all) to 5
(very original), with an original idea defined as “an idea that is
infrequent, novel, and original.” Therefore, coders were asked to
bear in mind both the objective frequency of a specific idea in a
sample, as well as subjective novelty and originality. Originality
of a participant was the average originality of all participant’s
ideas. A similar coding procedure was employed by De Dreu
et al. (2008). The interrater reliability was high: ICC (two-
way random model, absolute agreement) for fluency = 0.999,
p< 0.001, for flexibility ICC = 0.940, p< 0.001, and for originality
ICC = 0.845, p < 0.001 (Koo and Li, 2016). We used the
average scores across raters as indicators of divergent thinking
performance.
Analytic thinking task
The aim of the analytic task was to order men from the
lowest to the tallest (Ansburg and Hill, 2003; Towarzystwo
Upowszechniania Wiedzy i Nauk Matematycznych, 2016). Four
men were listed in the task. Establishing the correct order
required deriving three correct pairings (e.g., Rafael→Adam,
Adam→Michael, Michael→Lucas). One point was given for each
correct pairing. Therefore, participants could score between 0 and
3 points for the analytic thinking task.
FIGURE 4 | Breadth of attention (memory recognition index: percentage of
hits minus percentage of false alarms) in divergent thinking task condition, the
RAT, and analytic thinking task condition in Study 2.
The RAT
Participants scored 1 point for each correctly solved trial (Sobków
et al., 2016). Therefore, participants could score between 0 and 8
points in the RAT condition.
Results
Control Variables and Solution Time
We performed separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to
examine the effects of our manipulation on task enjoyment,
subjective difficulty, valence, and arousal, and found no effects
(all ps > 0.128). On average, participants spent 144 s on solving
analytic thinking task (SD = 57 s) and 144 s on solving the RAT
(SD = 76 s). The solution time of divergent thinking task was fixed
and was 180 s.
Effect of the Task on Breadth of Attention
We performed a one-way ANOVA with task type (divergent
thinking vs. analytic thinking vs. RAT) as independent variable
and the recognition index as dependent variable. We found a
significant difference in the memory recognition index among
the three conditions, F(2,135) = 4.25, p = 0.016 (see Figure 4).
A follow-up simple effects analysis revealed that recognition
in the divergent thinking condition (M = 9.49, SD = 17.03)
was significantly higher than in the analytic thinking condition
(M = −0.60, SD = 11.95, p = 0.013 with Bonferroni correction).
Confidence interval for this comparison did not include zero,
95% CI (1.69, 18.49), and the effect size was moderate (Cohen’s
d = 0.69). Recognition in the RAT condition (M = 4.09,
SD = 19.79) did not differ significantly from the other conditions
(ps> 0.357). Confidence intervals for comparisons between RAT
and other conditions included zero, 95% CI (−2.95, 13.75) with
divergent thinking task and 95% CI (−3.75, 13.13) with analytic
thinking task.
In order to verify whether time on task, mood, subjective
task difficulty, and enjoyment can account for the influence of
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the condition (divergent thinking vs. analytic thinking vs. RAT)
on breadth of attention, we performed analysis of covariance
with condition as independent variable, recognition index as a
dependent variable and solution time, valence, arousal, subjective
task difficulty, and enjoyment as covariates. All covariates apart
from subjective task difficulty were not significant (ps > 0.101).
However, subjective task difficulty was a significant covariate,
F(1,129) = 5.44, p = 0.021, but the effect of manipulation
(divergent thinking vs. analytic thinking vs. RAT) on recognition
index remained significant after controlling for covariates,
F(2, 129) = 5.48, p = 0.005.
Performance
We performed a correlation analysis separately for each condition
to test whether recognition (the index of attentional breadth) is
related to performance in each of the conditions. Performance
was related to recognition in the divergent thinking task
condition (rflexibility = 0.34, p = 0.019; roriginality = 0.29, p = .047,
n = 47) and the RAT condition (r = 0.44, p = 0.002, n = 46), but
not in the analytic thinking task condition (r = 0.14, p = 0.352,
n = 45).
Discussion of Study 2
Using a different measure of attentional breadth, Study 2
conceptually replicated the findings of Study 1 and strengthened
the evidence that engaging in divergent thinking tasks, compared
with engaging in analytic thinking tasks, broadens the scope of
attention. Interestingly, attentional breadth triggered by the RAT
did not differ significantly from attentional breadth triggered
by other tasks. A reason for this may be that the RAT can be
solved with different strategies that employ more divergent or
analytic thinking (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Bowden et al., 2005);
therefore, the effects of engagement in RAT may vary depending
on the method of solution. Furthermore, while reading the
RAT triads should broaden attentional field, looking for a
single solution is more likely to narrow the attentional breadth
(Topolinski and Strack, 2008), and this make the effects of RAT
more similar to the effects of divergent thinking and analytic
thinking task, respectively. This also implies that the differences
in top-down control state caused by divergent thinking and
the RAT may show up in contexts that favor strong but not
weak top-down control. For example, these effects may be
more pronounced when attention is measured with tasks that
favor narrow attentional breadth (see Fischer and Hommel,
2012).
In this study, we found the expected positive relationship
between breadth of attention and performance in divergent
thinking task. In contrast to Study 1, task performance was
not interrupted in this study, and this seems a plausible
reason why the correlation was stronger than in Study 1.
Similarly to previous findings, analytic thinking performance
did not correlate with attentional breadth (Ansburg and
Hill, 2003; Liu, 2016). However, we also found a positive
relationship between attentional breadth and the RAT
performance, which is consistent with the idea that a
weaker top-down control state facilitates finding remote
associates (cf. Martindale, 1989; Kolan´czyk, 2011; Kenett et al.,
2014).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The ability to process peripheral stimuli together with the
ability to broaden the attentional field has been suggested
to characterize creative problem solvers (Mendelsohn and
Griswold, 1964, 1966; Mendelsohn and Lindholm, 1972;
Kasof, 1997; Ansburg and Hill, 2003; Zmigrod et al., 2015).
What is more, evidence from experimental research has
shown that attentional breadth has a causal effect on
creativity (Friedman et al., 2003; Förster et al., 2004; Jia
et al., 2009; Colzato et al., 2012, 2017; Liu, 2016; Moraru
et al., 2016). However, attentional breadth has not been
examined as a result of engaging in a creative activity.
The present research shows that engaging in creative idea
generation indeed broadens the scope of attention compared
with engaging in analytic thinking and that this broadened
attention relates to higher creative performance. These
results suggest that the adjustment of the cognitive system
to task demands manifests at a fundamental, perceptual level,
through changes in breadth of visual attention. Below, we
interpret these results in terms of self-regulation, discuss the
limitations of our studies, and suggest questions for further
research.
Attentional Breadth as a Self-Regulation
Mechanism
Showing the reversed causal relationship between creativity
and attentional breadth provides a new perspective, in which
attentional breadth has a motivational basis. In this view,
attentional breadth is a result of adjusting cognitive processing
to task requirements, which ensures effective self-regulation (cf.
Bargh et al., 2001). During task engagement, people represent
task requirements as their goals, and these goals regulate
cognitive processing (e.g., Locke and Latham, 2002; Ferguson
et al., 2008). We extend this line of research by showing that
attentional breadth results from specific task requirements and
may play a self-regulatory role.
This perspective is consistent with several theoretical
approaches. For example, the extensive–intensive attention
theory (Kolan´czyk, 2011, 2012) suggests that ambiguous and
ill-defined goals (as in creative idea generation tasks) trigger
broad attention, while specific goals (as in analytic thinking
tasks) narrow the field of attention. When a goal is ill-defined,
broad attention enables exploration and flexibility, which in
turn facilitates goal attainment (cf. Johnson et al., 2006). The
broaden-and-built theory of positive emotions also points
to a similar function of broad attention (Fredrickson and
Branigan, 2005). It postulates that attentional breadth results
from emotions, with positive emotions broadening the scope
of attention and providing room for exploration and novel
behaviors. This self-regulatory role of attentional breadth has
also been found in the present research: Creative idea generation
led to broader attention than analytic thinking, and broad
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attention was related to increased creative performance.
Therefore, attentional breadth seems to align with task
requirements, which may support effective self-regulation
and goal attainment.
This line of reasoning is also compatible with construal
level theory (Trope and Liberman, 2010), which posits that
people represent objects at lower, concrete levels or at
higher, abstract levels. The level of representation depends
on psychological (temporal or physical) distance between the
self and represented objects: the greater the distance, the
more abstract and broad object representations. Therefore,
construal level adjusts to psychological distance, similar to how
attention adjusts to task demands. Indeed, studies have shown
that greater temporal, physical, or social distance facilitates
global (vs. local) processing, and thus broadens the attentional
field (Liberman and Förster, 2009). Similar to broad attention
increasing creative performance, temporal (Förster et al., 2004)
and physical distance (Jia et al., 2009) also increase creative
performance. Therefore, our results are consistent with construal
level theory findings. Engaging in creative idea generation,
compared with engaging in analytical thinking, is likely to elicit
simultaneously higher level construals and a broader attentional
field; however, the interdependence of these effects is yet to be
examined.
Limitations
Results of our experiments have to be interpreted in the light
of some limitations. A first limitation is that the two studies
differed on various aspects, including different divergent thinking
and analytic thinking tasks (and the inclusion of the RAT
only in Study 2), and different measures of attentional breadth.
In Study 1, task performance was interrupted and breadth of
attention was measured with a separate task, but in Study 2,
participants encoded the symbols during the task performance
and later reported their recognition of symbols. Therefore,
attention was measured without interrupting task performance
in Study 2 and participants were not even aware that the
recognition of symbols would later be measured. Although
findings were consistent in that the divergent thinking task
in both studies led to broader attention than the analytical
task, one finding was clearly different: breadth of attention
correlated with divergent thinking performance in Study 2
but not in Study 1. It is likely that this correlation was not
obtained in Study 1 because the measurement of attentional
breadth interfered with performance on the divergent thinking
task.
Second, we established our effects of type of task on
breadth of attention using between-participants designs. We
cannot exclude that a priori differences between conditions
existed in breadth of attention, although such differences
should be eliminated by random assignment of participants
to conditions. Nonetheless, within-participants designs would
offer the opportunity to observe changes in breadth of attention
as a consequence of performing a certain task, which would
offer strong evidence for the effects of task performance
on breadth of attention. One difficulty, however, with such
a design is that breadth of attention had to be measured
twice, and preferably with similar tasks, which may be
problematic because of learning effects (e.g., peripheral stimuli
might be intentionally memorized if the recognition test was
anticipated).
Third, and related, although we found that performing a
divergent thinking task led to higher breadth of attention than
performing an analytical task, we cannot conclude whether the
divergent task increased breadth of attention or the analytical
task lowered it. Again, a within-participants design may solve
the issue. Alternatively, some control condition could be used,
although it is not clear a priori which tasks would have no effect
on breadth of attention and could function as a neutral control
condition.
Future Directions
Besides addressing these limitations, we also see other
opportunities for future research. An interesting issue relates
to different manifestations of cognitive adjustment to task
demands. One line of research has linked creativity to the
tendency toward global vs. local processing (i.e., whether people
perceive an object as a whole or whether they attend to the
details of the object; Navon, 1977; Förster and Dannenberg,
2010). Our findings indicate that engaging in creativity can
increase breadth of attention, which may relate to more
global processing (cf. Hommel, Akbari Chermahini, van den
Wildenberg, and Colzato, unpublished manuscript). This was
visible, for example, in the identification of clusters of target
letters in Study 1, and “jumping” among these clusters, rather
than engaging in local and sequential search for single target
letters. However, other research has linked creativity to breadth
of attention through the functioning of an “attentional filter”
(Mendelsohn and Griswold, 1964; Mendelsohn and Lindholm,
1972; Zabelina et al., 2015, 2016). This work proposes that
creativity benefits from a “leaky” attentional filter, which allows
peripheral stimuli to enter the field of attention. Thus, engaging
in a creative task may also lead to increased sensitivity to
peripheral cues and a more “leaky” attentional filter, which
is consistent with our findings regarding recognition of
peripheral stimuli in Study 2. Perhaps the same adaptation of
attentional breadth to the ongoing situational demands can
manifest in different ways, and therefore, can be captured with
different methods. This is in line with self-regulatory role of
attention, and future research can examine this issue more
closely.
Future research could also clarify the role of the orienting
mechanism of attention – how attention aligns with an internal
(e.g., memory structure) or an external sensory (e.g., object
from the surroundings) stimulus (Posner, 1980). This mechanism
consists of overt and covert orienting. Overt orienting can be
observed through head and eye movements, whereas covert
orienting occurs when the object of attention changes without
eye or head movements. Broad attention can be achieved both
through overt (exploring the environment with multiple fixations
while thinking about the task solution) as well as covert orienting
(enhanced peripheral vision through more global processing
while still fixating on the task). Both mechanisms may be
responsible for our results, and future work could examine this.
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Importantly, Santangelo et al., 2011 (see Santangelo and
Spence, 2008 for a review) found that covert orienting toward
peripheral cues depends on how (objectively) difficult the main
task is in terms of perceptual load (amount of information
to be attended to). Even though we controlled for subjective
task difficulty, it is likely that perceptual load in each of the
tasks in Study 2 was different. For example, the divergent
thinking task consisted of a general instruction (“write down
all original and creative uses of a brick”) but had no further
restrictions (low perceptual load), whereas the analytic thinking
task consisted of a task instruction and a set of restrictions
which had to be respected in order to reach the solution
(high perceptual load). It is therefore possible that perceptual
load was responsible for the effect in Study 2. However, in
Study 1, attentional breadth was measured independently from
the main task – perceptual load during the Ellipses Test
was identical across conditions – which is inconsistent with
this alternative explanation. Nevertheless, future studies could
provide a more nuanced perspective on attentional breadth
triggered by divergent and analytical thinking tasks, through
manipulations of perceptual load.
Finally, it would be interesting to further investigate the
relationship between attentional breadth and solving the RAT
(Mednick, 1962). Although we did not detect a difference
in the attentional breadth triggered by the RAT vs. other
tasks, we did find a positive relationship between breadth of
attention and the RAT performance. A possible explanation
is that the RAT may involve characteristics of both divergent
thinking (e.g., employing various strategies in the search for
the solution) and analytic thinking (e.g., arriving at a single
correct solution through careful examination of existing options).
In contrast to analytic thinking tasks, the pathway to the
solution in the RAT is not straightforward and the most obvious
associations are often not correct, which requires the solver
to look for solutions in multiple directions. Therefore, the
RAT may benefit from broad attention, especially when the
correct solution is remotely related to all of the three provided
words; at the same time, it may trigger narrow attention,
because the task instruction emphasizes the goal of finding
the single correct solution (cf. Topolinski and Strack, 2008).
This explanation is partly supported by Harkins (2006), who
showed that inducing greater effort facilitates performance in
easy RAT items and inhibits performance in difficult RAT items.
The author found that the activation of close associates –
narrow attention – was responsible for worse performance
on difficult items under increased effort. Further work could
examine whether the positive relationship between attentional
breadth and the RAT performance holds only for the difficult
RAT items or whether it depends on the solution strategy
(insightful vs. analytic; Bowden et al., 2005). Additionally, it
would be interesting to examine how only reading RAT trials
vs. reading and searching for the solutions affects attentional
breadth.
Conclusion
The present research showed that engaging in creative idea
generation, as compared with engaging in analytic thinking,
broadens the scope of attention. Interestingly, we found that
broadened attention also relates to higher performance in
creative tasks. Our findings converge with the control-state
approach to creativity (Hommel, 2012), in which engaging in
creativity triggers stronger or weaker “top-down” guidance, and
spills over into how subsequent tasks are performed, depending
on whether the goal is to produce multiple different ideas or
to arrive at a single correct answer. The present findings shed
light on attentional breadth as a self-regulation mechanism:
we show that activating a goal embedded in a task leads
not only to adjustment of attentional breadth, but that this
adjustment may also support task performance. As such, this
work indicates that the cognitive system is highly adaptable to
task demands and that such adaptation can be observed at the
basic, perceptual level, through changes in breadth of visual
attention.
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